GHSA-xp9r-prpg-373r

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release. # Title `browser.request` still allows `POST /reset-profile` through the `operator.write` surface in OpenClaw `v2026.3.22` after `GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q` ## Severity Assessment High CWE: - `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization` Proposed CVSS v3.1: - `8.1` (`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`) An authenticated caller who only has access to the scoped Gateway method `browser.request` on the `operator.write` surface can still reach a destructive persistent-profile management route. Likely related advisory family: - `GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q` This should be treated as a later-version residual or incomplete fix. The earlier fix blocked `POST /profiles/create` and profile deletion, but the latest released `v2026.3.22` code still omits `POST /reset-profile` from the same mutation gate. ## Impact A caller with `operator.write` access to `browser.request` can still trigger persistent profile reset via `POST /reset-profile`. This crosses the intended privilege boundary for browser profile management because the release already attempts to block adjacent persistent profile mutations on this same surface. In practice, the allowed route reaches destructive behavior that can: - stop the running browser for that profile - close the Playwright browser connection for that profile - move the profile's local `userDataDir` to Trash when it exists This is a real integrity and availability impact on persistent browser state, not a route-classification mismatch with no side effects. ## Affected Component Product: - `openclaw` Tested latest released version: - release tag: `v2026.3.22` - release tag target commit (peeled tag): `e7d11f6c33e223a0dd8a21cfe01076bd76cef87a` Published artifact for that release: - package: `openclaw-2026.3.22.tgz` - package build-info commit: `4dcc39c25c6cc63fedfd004f52d173716576fcf0` - package build-info timestamp: `2026-03-23T10:56:05.946Z` Exact vulnerable paths on the shippe