GHSA-vqvg-86cc-cg83

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release. **Title** Mutating internal `/allowlist` chat commands missed `operator.admin` scope enforcement **CWE** CWE-862 Missing Authorization **CVSS v3.1** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Base score: **6.5 (Medium)** **Severity Assessment** Medium. This is a real authorization flaw in OpenClaw’s internal control plane. The issue does not require host access, trusted local state tampering, or multi-tenant assumptions, but exploitation does require an already authenticated internal Gateway caller with `operator.write`. **Impact** An authenticated internal Gateway caller limited to `operator.write` can perform state-changing `/allowlist` actions without `operator.admin`, even though comparable mutating internal chat commands already require `operator.admin`. The reachable effects are persistent changes to config-backed `allowFrom` entries and pairing-store-backed allowlist entries. This is not a semantic-modeling complaint and not a generic “trusted operator can do things” claim. It is a missing authorization check inside OpenClaw’s own internal scope model, where peer mutating command surfaces already distinguish `operator.write` from `operator.admin`. **Affected Component** Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag `v2026.3.23` (`ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`), published `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`. Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag: - `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:251-254` - `/allowlist` authorization uses only `rejectUnauthorizedCommand(...)`. - `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-524` - mutating config and pairing-store writes happen here, but there is no `requireGatewayClientScopeForInternalChannel(..., operator.admin, ...)`. Reachability and scope model: - `src/gateway/method-scopes.ts:94-109` - `chat.send` is a write-scoped method. - `src/gateway/server.chat.gateway-server-chat.test.ts:539-559` - existing runti