GHSA-vg6v-j97m-h5xq

Hi Novu team, Reporting an SSRF blocklist gap in the shared `validateUrlSsrf` guard. A complete self-contained reproduction is inlined below — copy the four files into a directory and run `docker compose up`, plus a single-file probe that runs against Node directly. Locally validated against HEAD `291817c`. ## Summary Novu's shared SSRF guard `validateUrlSsrf(url)` is used before server-side requests to user-configured URLs. The guard resolves hostnames and blocks a regex list of private/reserved IP ranges, but it does not block `100.64.0.0/10` shared address space. As a result, Novu features protected by this guard can still send server-side requests to destinations such as `100.100.100.200` (Alibaba Cloud metadata service) and any other service reachable in `100.64.0.0/10`. ## Affected code Guard: - `libs/application-generic/src/utils/ssrf-url-validation.ts` - `isPrivateIp(...)` regex list at lines 9-28 - DNS resolution and address validation at lines 55-72 Product call-sites: - Workflow HTTP request step: `apps/worker/src/app/workflow/usecases/send-message/execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(url)` at line 149, then uses `HttpClientService` to send the request. - Webhook filter condition: `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` — calls `validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl)` at line 265, then sends `axios.post(child.webhookUrl, ...)` at line 277. HTTP client: - `libs/application-generic/src/services/http-client/http-client.service.ts` — uses `got(gotOptions)` at lines 120 and 142 after the preflight validation. ## Root cause The SSRF guard uses a hand-written regex deny-list: ```ts /^0\.0\.0\.0$/i, /^127\./, /^10\./, /^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./, /^192\.168\./, /^169\.254\./, /^::ffff:127\./i, /^::ffff:10\./i, /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\./i, /^::ffff:192\.168\./i, /^::ffff:169\.254\./i, /^::1$/, /^fc00:/i, /^fe80:/i, ``` This list omits `100.64.0.0/10`, also called