GHSA-rjg6-39jm-rgg4

### Am I affected? You are affected if your application registers the `@better-auth/scim` plugin and lets authenticated users generate SCIM tokens. The default `canGenerateToken` policy was affected, and custom policies were affected when they did not reject provider IDs already used by other account providers. The provider-ID collision issue additionally requires SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social providers whose account rows use custom provider IDs, plus existing account rows under those IDs. The deprovisioning and email-update issues require only the SCIM plugin and a valid SCIM bearer token. Published versions from `@better-auth/[email protected]` through `1.6.21` are affected. Beta versions from `1.7.0-beta.0` through `1.7.0-beta.9` are affected. Upgrade to `@better-auth/[email protected]` or `1.7.0-beta.10`. ### Summary `@better-auth/scim` used the same logical provider ID for SCIM provider configuration and account ownership. SCIM token issuance did not reject all account-provider namespaces. An authenticated user could therefore mint a SCIM token whose provider ID matched an existing SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social provider. SCIM user routes then selected account rows by that provider ID and treated those users as SCIM-managed, even when the SCIM token had never provisioned them. The same write path had 2 additional validation issues. First, SCIM `active: false` was not modeled, so identity providers could receive a successful response while the user stayed active. Second, SCIM PUT and PATCH updates changed global email addresses without the same uniqueness check used by create, and `emailVerified` stayed unchanged after an email reassignment. ### Details The SCIM bearer middleware decoded the provider ID from the bearer token and loaded the matching `scimProvider` row. User listing and user lookup then queried ordinary account rows by `account.providerId`. This made the provider ID a user-controlled authorization key. If a SCIM token used