GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh

### Summary A workspace member can permanently delete any resource — projects, agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, and issue-label attachments — created by the workspace owner or other members. All six content DELETE endpoints enforce workspace membership but perform no ownership or role check. A single malicious or compromised member account can wipe an entire workspace's content irreversibly. ### Details The [published role capability matrix](https://docs.praison.ai/docs/features/platform/members) explicitly restricts members from modifying others' content: | Capability | Owner | Admin | Member | |---|---|---|---| | Create issues/tasks | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | Edit own content | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | Edit others' content | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | The DELETE handlers for all content resources check that the requesting user is a workspace member, but do not verify that the user either created the resource or holds an `owner`/`admin` role. The result is that the `member` role has unrestricted DELETE access over all workspace content regardless of who created it. **Confirmed vulnerable endpoints:** | Endpoint | Expected | Actual | |---|---|---| | `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` | 403 | 204 | | `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id}` | 403 | 204 | | `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}` | 403 | 204 | | `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id}` | 403 | 204 | | `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}` | 403 | 204 | | `DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id}` | 403 | 204 | The missing check is isolated to content resource DELETEs. ### PoC **Requirements:** Two accounts — owner (resource creator) and member (attacker). **1. Register both accounts** ```http POST /api/v1/auth/register Content-Type: application/json {"email": "[email protected]", "password": "Password1!", "name": "owner"} ``` ```http POST /api/v1