GHSA-rg3h-x3jw-7jm5

The fix for [CVE-2026-40315](https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x783-xp3g-mqhp) added input validation to `SQLiteConversationStore` only. Nine sibling backends — MySQL, PostgreSQL, async SQLite/MySQL/PostgreSQL, Turso, SingleStore, Supabase, SurrealDB — pass `table_prefix` straight into f-string SQL. Same root cause, same code pattern, same exploitation. 52 unvalidated injection points across the codebase. `postgres.py` additionally accepts an unvalidated `schema` parameter used directly in DDL. ### Severity **High** — CWE-89 (SQL Injection) CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N — **8.1** Exploitable in any deployment where `table_prefix` is derived from external input (multi-tenant setups, API-driven configuration, user-modifiable config files). Default config (`"praison_"`) is not affected. ### Details The [CVE-2026-40315 fix](https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x783-xp3g-mqhp) added this guard to `sqlite.py:52`: ```python # sqlite.py — PATCHED import re if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]*$', table_prefix): raise ValueError("table_prefix must contain only alphanumeric characters and underscores") ``` The following backends perform the identical `table_prefix → f-string SQL` pattern **without this guard**: | Backend | File | Line | Injection points | | ---------------- | -------------------------------------------- | --------------- | ----------------------- | | MySQL | `persistence/conversation/mysql.py` | 65 | 5 | | PostgreSQL | `persistence/conversation/postgres.py` | 89 (+schema:88) | 10 | | Async SQLite | `persistence/conversation/async_sqlite.py` | 43 | 13 | | Async MySQL | `persistence/conversation/async_mysql.py` | 65 | 13 | | Async PostgreSQL