GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp

OpenClaw's macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces. Before the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway `token` and `password` to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser `localStorage` under `openclaw.control.settings.v1`. This expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Latest published version verified vulnerable: `2026.3.2` - Affected range: `<= 2026.3.2` - Patched version: `>= 2026.3.7` ## Impact An attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface. The exposure chain was: 1. macOS `Open Dashboard` constructed a URL with auth material. 2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL. 3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL. 4. The Control UI persisted the token in `localStorage`. ## Fix The fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage: - macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters. - macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs. - Control UI keeps Gateway tokens in memory only for the current tab. - Control UI scrubs legacy persisted tokens from `openclaw.control.settings.v1` on load. - Regression tests cover fragment transport, password omission, and token-scrubbing behavior. ## Fix Commit(s) - `10d0e3f3ca92326df0ca071fabffe463742f263c` (March 7, 2026) ## Release Process Note npm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package. Thanks @whiter6666 for reporting.