GHSA-r39h-4c2p-3jxp

## Summary OpenClaw's bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to `process.cwd()` while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing `extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js`, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution. ## Impact This is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected: versions before `2026.4.23` - Fixed: `2026.4.23` - Latest stable verified fixed: `[email protected]`, tag `v2026.4.23` ## Fix OpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes `process.cwd()` as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local `extensions/<plugin>/setup-api.js` is not loaded through provider setup resolution. ## Fix Commit(s) - `993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707` (`fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback`) ## Severity Severity remains `high` because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user running OpenClaw. The CVSS vector is local/user-interaction scoped rather than network-only because the victim must run OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled directory.