GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f

# Message-level `raw` option bypasses `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess`, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF in the sent message - **Target:** nodemailer/nodemailer, npm `nodemailer` **v9.0.0** (HEAD `4e58450eb490e5097a74b2b2cce35a8d9e21856e`) - **Verdict:** CONFIRMED (local PoC, no network) ## Summary Nodemailer exposes `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` so an application that passes **untrusted** message data to the library can forbid that data from reading local files or fetching URLs. Every attachment, alternative, `html`/`text`/`watchHtml`/`amp` and `icalEvent` content node honors these flags. **The message-level `raw` option does not.** `MailComposer.compile()` builds the root MIME node for a `raw` message **without** threading the two flags, so a `raw: { path: '/etc/passwd' }` or `raw: { href: 'http://169.254.169.254/…' }` message is read / fetched anyway, and the file or HTTP-response bytes become the **actual message that is sent** by every transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON). An actor whose input the application intended to sandbox therefore obtains arbitrary local-file disclosure and a full-response SSRF primitive, delivered to a recipient the same actor can choose. This is the same vulnerability class as the already-published jsonTransport advisory **GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f**, but a **distinct code path** (`raw` root node, not `normalize()`), and strictly higher impact: the jsonTransport bug only affected the locally-returned JSON, whereas this affects the delivered RFC822 message for all transports. ## Affected component - `lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35` — root cause: ```js if (this.mail.raw) { this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline: this.mail.newline }).setRaw(this.mail.raw); } ``` The `MimeNode` is constructed with only `{ newline }`. Compare the sibling node builders `_createMixed`/`_createAlternative`/`_createRelated`/`_createContentNode` (`lib/mail-composer/index.js