GHSA-mw8f-w6p8-xrf4

## Summary GHSA-mhc8-p3jx-84mm (CVE-2026-43948) reported that wger's `reset_user_password` and `gym_permissions_user_edit` views in `wger/gym/views/user.py` performed a gym-scope authorization check using Django ORM object comparison (`if request.user.userprofile.gym != user.userprofile.gym`) which silently passes when both sides are `None` (`None != None` evaluates to `False`). The maintainer's suggested patch ("Apply the same `same_gym()` helper pattern to all five views sharing this check") replaces every `userprofile.gym !=` site with the new `is_same_gym()` helper that explicitly excludes `None` (`gym_a is not None and gym_a == gym_b`). The fix landed in `wger/gym/views/{admin_notes,document,contract,gym}.py` (5 views, all using `is_same_gym`). However, **three additional views in `wger/core/views/user.py` were not migrated** and retain the original `userprofile.gym_id != ...` raw integer comparison. Because raw integer `!=` comparison still evaluates `None != None` as `False`, the gym-scope guard is bypassed identically to the patched views. The result is a complete incomplete-fix variant family that reproduces against the latest `wger/server:latest` Docker image (master, 2026-05-08 build). A privileged-but-bounded gym staff user (admin-granted `gym.manage_gym` permission, intended scope: managing members of one specific gym) whose `userprofile.gym = None` (the default state before the admin links them to a gym) can: 1. **Permanently delete any other user with `gym = None`** (V3, `delete` view, line 131 — CRITICAL data loss, irreversible) 2. **Deactivate any other user with `gym = None`**, locking them out of the platform (V1, `UserDeactivateView`, line 405 — high availability impact) 3. **Re-activate any previously deactivated user with `gym = None`** (V2, `UserActivateView`, line 442 — counters defensive deactivation) Victim user pks are sequential integers and trivially enumerable via `/en/user/<pk>/overview` and other endpoints. The `same_gym_id == ..