GHSA-jf2q-463c-6f52

### Summary `generateZipPath()` constructs zip entry names for collected APKs using device controlled content from `extractFileName()`. Since `extractFileName()` does not reject traversal sequences, the resulting zip entry name can contain `../`. AndroidQF itself does not extract the zip it creates, but any forensic tool that extracts the acquisition bundle without zip-slip protection could write files to attacker chosen paths. ### Impact A compromised device could inject path traversal sequences into the acquisition bundle's zip entry names. When a forensic analyst or forensic tooling extracts the bundle without entry name validation, files could be written outside the intended extraction directory. ### Patched version [1.8.3](https://github.com/mvt-project/androidqf/releases/tag/v1.8.3) ### Credits This issue was identified during a security assessment conducted by 0xche.