GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f

## Summary The issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions. ## Affected Behavior - `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing. - Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:<peerId>`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled. ## Attack Preconditions - Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token. - Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values. - Target session keys can be derived or guessed. Without those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access. ## Impact - Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions. - Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused. - Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses. ## Affected Versions - `openclaw` `>= 2.0.0-beta3` and `< 2026.2.12` ## Patched Versions - `openclaw` `>= 2026.2.12` ## Fix OpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing: - `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`. - Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing. - Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys. - Security audit warns on unsafe hook session-routing settings. ## Recommended Configuration ```json { "hooks": { "enabled": true, "token": "${OPENCLAW_HOOKS_TOKEN}", "defaultSessionKey": "hook:ingress", "allowRequestSessionKey": false, "allowedSessionKeyPrefixes": ["hook:"] } } ``` ## Credit Thanks @alpernae for responsible reporting.