GHSA-g4qm-m288-5cp9

## Summary Coraza's cookie parser (`internal/cookies.ParseCookies`) does not strip ASCII control characters (CTLs) from the edges of a cookie name/value before they're matched against `REQUEST_COOKIES` / `REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES`. When a CTL sits directly next to the `=` separator, Coraza absorbs it into the adjacent name or value, while several backend cookie parsers trim it away — so the WAF and the application disagree about the cookie it just received. ## Root cause - `ParseCookies` (`internal/cookies/cookies.go:17,26,31`) trims via `net/textproto.TrimString`, which strips only space (`0x20`) and tab (`0x09`). - RFC 6265 §4.1.1 defines cookie `name` as an HTTP `token` and `value` as `cookie-octet`, both excluding the full C0 control range (`0x00–0x1F`, `0x7F`) — not just space/tab. - Input `a\v=\t'` (vertical tab `\v` next to `=`) keeps `\v` in the name (`a\v`), yielding name=`a\v`, value=`\t'`. ## Confirmed divergence from real backends | Implementation | Name | Value | |---|---|---| | Coraza (< 3.8.0) | `a\v` | `\t'` | | Python `http.cookies`, and the Werkzeug/Flask version in the report below | `a` | `'` | | PHP `$_COOKIE` | `a` | `\t'` | | Node.js `cookie` package | `a\v` | `'` | RFC 6265 itself calls this exact cookie-pair invalid, so there's no single spec-correct reference — but Coraza's boundary handling diverges from 2 of these 3 widely-used backends. Correction (2026-10-02): current Werkzeug (3.1.9, checked during review of the 3.8.1 follow-up) keeps `a\v` as the name, like Node's `cookie` package. The name divergence therefore applies to PHP and to Python's `http.cookies`, not to every Werkzeug version. ## Impact An attacker can pad a `Cookie` header with a CTL adjacent to `=` so Coraza indexes a different name/value than the backend application does. A `SecRule` scoped to a specific cookie name or value can then miss the cookie the application actually processes — a WAF bypass for cookie-carried attacks. ## Affected component `internal/cookies.Pa