GHSA-fpw6-hrg5-q5x5

## Summary Access tokens created with the "never expire" option have no `exp` JWT claim. Three independent revocation mechanisms fail for this token type. Logout at `internal/handler/auth/auth.go:154` and `:163` dereferences `claims.ExpiresAt.Time`, panicking on the nil field so the token never hits the blacklist. `RevokeToken` at `internal/repository/auth/auth.go:45-50` skips when `remainTTL <= 0`. The admin's "Delete token" panel action at `internal/service/setting/access_token_service.go:183-185` removes the database record but does not call `RevokeToken` to blacklist the JTI. Once a never-expire token leaks, the JWT stays cryptographically valid until the admin rotates the signing key across the entire instance. ## Details Creation path at `internal/util/jwt/jwt.go:103-105`: ```go // expiry = 0 表示永不过期 if expiry > 0 { claims.ExpiresAt = jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second)) } ``` For `NEVER_EXPIRY`, `expiry = 0` and the conditional skips. The resulting JWT has no `exp` claim. The middleware at `internal/middleware/auth.go` accepts it; the `jwt/v5` parser does not require `exp` by default. Failure mode 1, logout panic at `internal/handler/auth/auth.go:163`: ```go // Refresh-token revocation at line 154 (safe in practice: refresh tokens always have exp). // Access-token revocation, same pattern, at line 163 (the bug): if claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(authHeader[7:]); err == nil && claims.ID != "" { remaining := time.Until(claims.ExpiresAt.Time) // nil deref when ExpiresAt is nil h.authService.RevokeToken(claims.ID, remaining) } ``` For a never-expire access token, `claims.ExpiresAt` is nil. `claims.ExpiresAt.Time` panics. Gin's Recovery middleware catches it and returns HTTP 500; the JTI never reaches `RevokeToken`. Line 154 shares the same pattern against refresh tokens, but refresh tokens are always issued with an expiry so the nil dereference does not fire there in practice. Failure mode 2, `Revok