GHSA-f67f-hcr6-94mf

## Summary The `ZenClaw Discord Integration` GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to shell command injection. The issue title field, controllable by any GitHub user, is interpolated directly into a `run` shell block via a GitHub Actions template expression. An attacker can craft an issue title containing a subshell expression that executes arbitrary commands on the runner during variable assignment, enabling exfiltration of the `DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL` secret. The trigger requires no repository privileges. ## Affected Component **File:** `.github/workflows/zenclaw-discord.yml` **Commit:** `07e65c72656a8213fc9ece2b3f4fc719032cfc5d` **URL:** `https://github.com/SHAdd0WTAka/Zen-Ai-Pentest/blob/07e65c72656a8213fc9ece2b3f4fc719032cfc5d/.github/workflows/zenclaw-discord.yml` **Step:** `Prepare Notification` **Trigger:** `issues: [opened]` — no repository privileges required --- ## Description In the `Prepare Notification` step, the issue title is assigned to a shell variable using direct GitHub Actions template interpolation inside a `case` block: ```bash issues) ... DESCRIPTION="${{ github.event.issue.title }}" ;; ``` The GitHub Actions template engine resolves `${{ github.event.issue.title }}` **at workflow compilation time**, embedding the raw issue title as literal text in the bash script before execution. The value is assigned inside a double-quoted string, which in bash evaluates subshell expressions of the form `$(...)` and backtick expressions `` `...` `` at runtime. Although a subsequent sanitization step is applied: ```bash DESCRIPTION=$(echo "$DESCRIPTION" | tr '\n' ' ' | cut -c1-1000) ``` This sanitization runs **after** the assignment — the subshell in the title has already executed by the time `tr` and `cut` process the output. The sanitization is therefore ineffective as a security control against command injection. The resulting `DESCRIPTION` value is then written to `$GITHUB_OUTPUT`: ```bash echo "description=$DESCRIPTION" >> $GIT