GHSA-cwj3-vqpp-pmxr

## Summary The agent-facing `gateway` tool protects `config.apply` and `config.patch` with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations. ## Impact A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only `gateway` tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected: versions before `2026.4.23` - Fixed: `2026.4.23` - Latest stable verified fixed: `[email protected]`, tag `v2026.4.23` ## Fix OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven `gateway config.apply` and `gateway config.patch` now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked. ## Fix Commit(s) - `bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec` (`fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits`) ## Severity Severity remains `high`. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw's security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.