GHSA-7xp7-m392-h92c

## Summary The EvoMap proxy daemon's HTTP body parser accepts requests of any size, and the `POST /asset/submit` route persists the full request body — verbatim and uncapped — as a JSONL line in `<dataDir>/messages.jsonl`. An unauthenticated local attacker (other local user, container neighbor, or malicious npm postinstall script running on the same host) can repeatedly POST large bodies to fill the disk. On restart, the daemon synchronously reads the entire file via `fs.readFileSync`, making the OOM/crash persistent. ## Details **1. Entry — unbounded body parser** (`src/proxy/server/http.js:9-21`): ```js function parseBody(req) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { const chunks = []; req.on('data', c => chunks.push(c)); req.on('end', () => { const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString(); if (!raw) return resolve({}); try { resolve(JSON.parse(raw)); } catch (e) { reject(new Error('Invalid JSON body')); } }); req.on('error', reject); }); } ``` There is no Content-Length validation and no cumulative-bytes cap on `chunks`. **2. Route — no schema or size validation** (`src/proxy/server/routes.js:75-85`): ```js 'POST /asset/submit': async ({ body }) => { if (!body.assets && !body.asset_id) { throw Object.assign(new Error('assets or asset_id is required'), { statusCode: 400 }); } const result = store.send({ type: 'asset_submit', payload: body, priority: body.priority || 'normal', }); return { body: result }; } ``` The full `body` (including arbitrarily large `body.assets[*].blob`) is forwarded to `store.send()` as the message payload. `POST /mailbox/send` has the same shape. **3. Sink — unbounded JSONL append** (`src/proxy/mailbox/store.js`): ```js // line 71-73 function appendLine(filePath, obj) { fs.appendFileSync(filePath, JSON.stringify(obj) + '\n', 'utf8'); } // line 189-209: send() builds a message wrapping the payload and calls _appendMessage // line 166-171: _appendMessage(