GHSA-796m-2973-wc5q

### Summary `tools.exec` allowlist/safe-bins evaluation could diverge from runtime execution for wrapper commands using GNU `env -S/--split-string` semantics. This allowed policy checks to treat a command as a benign safe-bin invocation while runtime executed a different payload. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Vulnerable versions: `<= 2026.2.22-2` (latest currently published npm version) - Patched version (released): `2026.2.23` ### Impact An attacker able to influence tool command text (for example via untrusted prompt/content injection reaching an exec-capable flow) could bypass allowlist/safe-bins intent and execute unexpected commands. ### Technical Details Root cause was policy/runtime interpretation mismatch for dispatch wrappers: - analysis resolved an effective executable from wrapper-unwrapped argv, - execution could still run original wrapper argv semantics, - safe-bin short-flag handling also allowed unknown short options in clusters. ### Remediation The fix hardens exec approvals to fail closed and enforce analysis/runtime parity: - introduce wrapper execution planning with semantic-wrapper blocking, - carry planned `effectiveArgv` + `policyBlocked` metadata through resolution, - evaluate allowlist/safe-bins against planned argv, - enforce canonical rebuilt shell command from planned argv for allowlist auto-paths, - use planned argv for node-host/mac exec-host invocation paths, - reject unknown short safe-bin flags, - add regression tests for semantic `env` wrappers and parity fixtures. ### Fix Commit(s) - `a1c4bf07c6baad3ef87a0e710fe9aef127b1f606` ### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the released version (`2026.2.23`). Patched in `2026.2.23` and published. OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.