GHSA-59fh-9f3p-7m39

### Summary A Mass Assignment vulnerability in the PUT /api/v1/user endpoint allows authenticated users to directly modify restricted user fields, including the credential (password hash), bypassing the intended password change workflow. Because the endpoint forwards the entire request body to the service layer without filtering, an attacker can override the credential field without providing the current password. This bypasses several security protections including: - old password verification - password hashing enforcement - password policy validation - session invalidation on password change While the vulnerability cannot be used to modify other users due to an ID check in the controller, it allows attackers who obtain a temporary session (e.g., via token theft or XSS) to establish persistent account access. ### Details The endpoint **PUT /api/v1/user** allows authenticated users to update their user profile. The controller checks that the authenticated user matches the provided id, preventing direct IDOR: ```typescript const currentUser = req.user const { id } = req.body if (currentUser.id !== id) { throw new InternalFlowiseError(StatusCodes.FORBIDDEN) } ``` However, the controller forwards the entire request body directly to the service layer without filtering: ```typescript const user = await userService.updateUser(req.body) ``` Inside UserService.updateUser, the incoming data is merged into the existing user entity: ```typescript updatedUser = queryRunner.manager.merge(User, oldUserData, newUserData) ``` Because newUserData is derived from req.body and there is no field allowlist, any field present in the User entity may be modified. This includes sensitive fields such as: - credential - tempToken - tokenExpiry - status - email The service implements a secure password change workflow that requires the following fields: ```typescript oldPassword newPassword confirmPassword ``` Example code: ```typescript if (newUserData.oldPassword && n