GHSA-3rcm-vjrc-p45j
## Summary `to_markdown()` does not sufficiently escape text content that looks like HTML. As a result, untrusted input that is safe in `to_html()` can become raw HTML in Markdown output. This is not specific to tokenizer raw-text states like `<title>`, `<noscript>`, or `<plaintext>`, although those states can trigger the behavior. The root cause is broader: Markdown text serialization leaves angle brackets unescaped in text nodes. ## Details When converting a parsed document to Markdown, text nodes are escaped for a small set of Markdown metacharacters, but HTML-significant characters such as `<` and `>` are preserved. That means content parsed as text, including entity-decoded text or text produced by RCDATA/RAWTEXT-style parsing, can be emitted into Markdown as raw HTML. Examples of affected input include: - Text produced from entity-decoded input such as `<script>...</script>` - Text inside elements like `<title>`, `<textarea>`, `<noscript>` (when parsed as raw text), and `<plaintext>` This is distinct from actual `<script>` or `<style>` elements in the DOM. Those are already dropped by default in `to_markdown()` unless `html_passthrough=True`. ## Proof of Concept ### General case ```python from justhtml import JustHTML doc = JustHTML("<p><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></p>", fragment=True) print(doc.to_html()) print() print(doc.to_markdown())
Properties
- ghsa_id
- GHSA-3rcm-vjrc-p45j
- severity
- medium
- summary
- JustHTML has a Sanitizer Bypass (in Markdown)
- cve_id
- GHSA-3rcm-vjrc-p45j
- is_ghsa_only
- true
- ghsa_published
- 2026-03-18T20:19:56Z
- source_url
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3rcm-vjrc-p45j
- ghsa_updated
- 2026-03-18T20:19:56Z
Related Entities (3)
AFFECTS (1)
HAS_WEAKNESS (1)
REPORTED_BY (1)
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