GHSA-39mp-545q-w789

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release. **Title** Non-owner command-authorized sender can change the owner-only `/send` session delivery policy **CWE** CWE-285 Improper Authorization **CVSS v3.1** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L Base score: **5.4 (Medium)** **Severity Assessment** Medium. This is a real owner-only authorization bypass, but the demonstrated impact is limited to persistent mutation of the current session’s delivery policy rather than direct code execution, sandbox escape, or cross-host compromise. **Impact** A non-owner sender who is allowed to run commands can invoke `/send on|off|inherit` and persistently change the current session’s `sendPolicy`, even though OpenClaw documents `/send` as owner-only. That lets a lower-trust participant: - disable reply delivery for the current session (`/send off`), suppressing future replies in that chat; - re-enable reply delivery (`/send on`) after the owner intentionally disabled it; - remove the session override (`/send inherit`). **Affected Component** Verified against the latest published GitHub release tag `v2026.3.23` (`ccfeecb6887cd97937e33a71877ad512741e82b2`), published `2026-03-23T23:15:50Z`. Exact vulnerable path on the shipped tag: - `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-session.ts:212-239` - `handleSendPolicyCommand(...)` checks only `params.command.isAuthorizedSender`. - when true, it mutates `params.sessionEntry.sendPolicy` and persists the session entry. Authorization behavior that makes this reachable: - `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts:401-407` - `senderIsOwner` is computed separately from general command authorization. - `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts:420-429` - command authorization can succeed even when `senderIsOwner === false`. - `src/auto-reply/command-auth.owner-default.test.ts:10-47` - existing coverage confirms a sender can be command-authorized while not treated as owner. Documented owner-only contract: - `docs/tools/slash-co