GHSA-2vx9-7wpg-88jq

## Impact The `ExecuteWorkflow` node's `localFile` source option read workflow files from disk without applying checks enforced by other file-reading nodes. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could supply an arbitrary file path via the REST API, bypassing the `N8N_RESTRICT_FILE_ACCESS_TO` restriction. This allowed the attacker to determine whether arbitrary files exist on the server host. Where the targeted path contained a valid workflow JSON file, the file could additionally be loaded and executed, potentially triggering actions on downstream systems connected to that workflow. The `localFile` source option is hidden from the n8n UI since v1.2 but remains accessible via the REST API. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.20.0 or 2.19.3. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Restrict network access to the n8n REST API to trusted users only. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.