GHSA-2rp4-x2j7-qmcc

The control-panel helper that renders element chip/card labels writes an element's `draftName` into the page without HTML-encoding it, while the surrounding path segments are encoded. A low-privilege control-panel user who can create a draft of an element (for example, an entry) controls the draft name, so they can store an XSS payload that executes in the browser of any other control-panel user who is shown that element’s chip or card (element indexes with drafts visible, relation and element-selection fields that reference the element, and the drafts list). This allows a low-privilege author to run JavaScript in an administrator’s authenticated session and take over the control panel. It is the same output-encoding class as the recently fixed GHSA-xrqc-p465-2xvg (Structure entry title) and GHSA-3x4w-mxpf-fhqq (revision context menu), which encoded other user-controlled titles but not the draft name. ### Prerequisites - A control-panel account with permission to edit entries in at least one section and create drafts. - A higher-privileged user (for example, an administrator) who is later shown the draft’s chip or card (an element index with drafts visible, or a relation/element-selection field referencing the element). ### Limitations - Requires the victim to be shown the affected element's chip/card in the control panel (normal day-to-day activity; element indexes and relation fields are routine). - The payload runs in the control-panel origin in the victim’s session. ## Impact A low-privilege author can run arbitrary JavaScript in the session of any higher-privileged control-panel user who is shown the element’s chip or card, including administrators. This is a cross-privilege stored XSS, not a self-XSS: the attacker and the victim are different users, and the payload fires during routine browsing of element indexes and relation fields. Because the script runs in the victim’s control-panel origin, it can read the CSRF token that Craft embeds in the page