GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3

### Summary When the crawler saves a downloaded file, the destination filename was taken from attacker-influenced input and joined to the downloads directory with no confinement. A filename containing an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/cron.d/evil`) or `../` traversal escaped the downloads directory, giving an arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled contents. Because the written bytes are attacker-controlled, this escalates to remote code execution (overwriting a shell rc-file, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, a cron entry, or a Python module on the import path). ### Affected paths Two download sinks in `crawl4ai/async_crawler_strategy.py`: - HTTP crawler (`AsyncHTTPCrawlerStrategy`): the filename is parsed from the response `Content-Disposition` header by `_extract_filename()` and written via `aiofiles.open(filepath, 'wb')`. Reachable directly via the SDK, and via the unauthenticated Docker `/crawl` endpoint when an `HTTPCrawlerConfig` is supplied. - Browser crawler (`AsyncPlaywrightCrawlerStrategy`): the download's `suggested_filename` (controllable by the visited page) is joined to `downloads_path` and written via `download.save_as()`. The HTTP-strategy sink is reachable pre-auth on the default Docker deployment; both are reachable for SDK users simply by crawling an attacker-controlled URL. The default Playwright crawl path that does not trigger a download is unaffected. ### Impact Arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content as the user running the crawler, escalating to remote code execution. ### Fix Both sinks now resolve the destination through a single hardened helper (`_safe_download_filepath`) that reduces the attacker-influenced name to a bare basename (dropping absolute paths and `..` components) and re-checks, via `realpath`, that the resolved path stays inside the downloads root (defeating symlink/TOCTOU escapes). A traversal attempt is rejected; normal downloads are unchanged. ### Workarounds - Upgrade to the patched version (0.9.0). - Ru