GHSA-2hx3-vp6r-mg3f

# Code Generation Literal Injection in Kiota ## Summary Kiota versions **prior to 1.31.1** are affected by a code-generation literal injection vulnerability in multiple writer sinks (for example: serialization/deserialization keys, path/query parameter mappings, URL template metadata, enum/property metadata, and default value emission). When malicious values from an OpenAPI description are emitted into generated source without context-appropriate escaping, an attacker can break out of string literals and inject additional code into generated clients. ## Impact and Preconditions This issue is only practically exploitable when: 1. the OpenAPI description used for generation is from an **untrusted source**, or 2. a normally trusted OpenAPI description has been **compromised/tampered with**. If you only generate from trusted, integrity-protected API descriptions, risk is significantly reduced. ## Affected Versions - **Affected:** all versions **< 1.31.1** - **Fixed:** **1.31.1** and later ## Illustrative Exploit Example ### Example OpenAPI fragment (malicious default value) ```yaml openapi: 3.0.1 info: title: Exploit Demo version: 1.0.0 components: schemas: User: type: object properties: displayName: type: string default: "\"; throw new System.Exception(\"injected\"); //" ``` ### Example generated C# snippet before fix (illustrative) ```csharp public User() { DisplayName = ""; throw new System.Exception("injected"); //"; } ``` The injected payload escapes the intended string context and introduces attacker-controlled statements in generated code. > Note: this exploit is not limited to default values, but may also impact properties names (serialization), path or query parameters, enum representations and other locations. ## Remediation 1. Upgrade Kiota to **1.31.1 or later**. 2. Regenerate/refresh existing generated clients as a precaution: ```bash kiota update ``` Refreshing generated clients ensu