GHSA-29w3-p9w9-wc47

## Summary The `multiedit` tool in `src/praisonai/praisonai/tools/multiedit.py` allows LLM-controlled arbitrary file read and write without any path validation, workspace boundary check, or protected path guard. This enables an attacker who can influence agent tool arguments (via crafted prompts, user input in chat bots, or malicious YAML workflow configs) to read sensitive files (e.g., `/etc/shadow`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`) and overwrite arbitrary files on the filesystem. ## Details The `filepath` parameter is used directly with `open()` for both reading (line 74) and writing (line 130) without any of the following protections that exist in other tools in the same codebase: 1. **No `..` path traversal check** — unlike `file_tools.py` (line 66: `if '..' in filepath: raise ValueError`) and `edit_tools.py` (line 35). 2. **No workspace boundary validation** — unlike `file_tools.py` (`_validate_path` with `os.path.commonpath` check) and `skill_tools.py` (`read_skill_file` with workspace boundary check). 3. **No protected path guard** — unlike `praisonai/code/tools/` which uses `is_path_within_directory` and protected path checks. 4. **No symlink resolution** — unlike `file_tools.py` which uses `os.path.realpath`. The function is exported via `src/praisonai/praisonai/tools/__init__.py` as a lazy-loaded tool and is available to agents through the PraisonAI CLI tools registry. **Contrast with protected tools:** The sibling tools `write_file.py`, `read_file.py`, `apply_diff.py`, and `search_replace.py` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/code/tools/` all implement `is_path_within_directory()` checks and protected path guards. The `multiedit` tool has none of these protections. ## PoC **Setup:** Clean checkout of PraisonAI at commit `d5f1114a`. No additional dependencies needed beyond Python 3.10+. **Positive trigger — arbitrary file read via dry_run:** ```bash cd /tmp && python3 -c " import sys sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai') from praisonai.tools.multiedi