GHSA-265w-rf2w-cjh4

### Summary Paperclip contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows an attacker with an Agent API key to execute arbitrary OS commands on the Paperclip server host. An attacker with an agent credential can escalate privileges from the agent runtime to the Paperclip server host. The vulnerability occurs because agents are allowed to update their own adapterConfig via the /agents/:id API endpoint. The configuration field adapterConfig.workspaceStrategy.provisionCommand is later executed by the server runtime using: ``` spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", command]) ``` As a result, an attacker controlling an agent credential can inject arbitrary shell commands which are executed by the Paperclip server during workspace provisioning. This breaks the intended trust boundary between agent runtime configuration and server host execution, allowing a compromised or malicious agent to escalate privileges and run commands on the host system. This vulnerability allows remote code execution on the server host. ### Details #### Rootcause Agent configuration can be modified through the API endpoint: ``` PATCH /api/agents/:id ``` The validation schema allows arbitrary configuration fields: ``` adapterConfig: z.record(z.unknown()) ``` This allows attackers to inject arbitrary keys into the adapter configuration object. Later, during workspace provisioning, the server runtime executes a shell command derived directly from this configuration. Relevant code path: ``` server/src/services/workspace-runtime.ts adapterConfig.workspaceStrategy.provisionCommand ↓ provisionExecutionWorktree() ↓ runWorkspaceCommand(...) ↓ spawn("/bin/sh", ["-c", input.command]) ``` Example logic: ``` const provisionCommand = asString(input.strategy.provisionCommand, "").trim() await runWorkspaceCommand({ command: provisionCommand }) ``` Inside runWorkspaceCommand the command is executed using: ``` spawn(shell, ["-c", input.command]) ``` Because no validation, escaping, or allowlis