CVE-2026-99796
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel() until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held. A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s, 0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup watchdog fires: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100] RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0 io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170 io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0 __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110 Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket. __io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled. A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead of stopping at the match.
Properties
- Last source
- FIRST EPSS
- Nvd fetched at
- 2026-11-22T12:30:49.958423+00:00
- Epss score
- 0.00296
- Cve id
- CVE-2026-99796
- First seen by Signal
- 2026-11-20T11:40:59+00:00
- Name
- CVE-2026-99796
- Retrieved at
- 2026-11-22T12:32:29+00:00
- Published at
- 2026-11-20T08:18:37.177
- Last modified
- 2026-11-20T08:18:37.177
- Epss percentile
- 0.22589
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