CVE-2026-92708

### Impact `stringify` and `uneval` serialize a typed array by emitting its backing `ArrayBuffer`, not just the view. In the case of a Node `Buffer` object, the backing buffer is a process-wide shared pool, meaning unrelated memory can be serialized into a response that is then sent to the client. For a Node `Buffer` the backing store is Node's **process-wide shared pool**, so serializing a small `Buffer` copies up to 64 KB of unrelated process memory — including bytes from other in-flight requests — into the output. In an SSR framework (SvelteKit, Nuxt) a public page whose `load()` returns a 2-byte `Buffer`, or a small file read with `readFileSync`, ships another user's request body / `Authorization` header in its HTML. Unauthenticated, silent, ~43,000× amplification. This is serialization-side, so the `parse`/`unflatten` prototype-pollution and DoS guards do not apply — it fires on every SSR render, not only when parsing untrusted input. ### Workarounds Convert Node `Buffer` objects to `Uint8Array`: ```diff payload = { - buffer + buffer: new Uint8Array(buffer) } ```