CVE-2026-8384

### Description (as reported) #### Summary In Jetty 12.1.8, org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil.canonicalPath() may leave dot-dot path segments unnormalized when a semicolon path parameter marker is followed by a slash and a dot segment. A minimal example is: `/public;/../admin/secret` In my local reproduction, URIUtil.canonicalPath() returns: `/public/../admin/secret` instead of the expected normalized path: `/admin/secret` When Jetty's `SecurityHandler.PathMapped` is used to protect a path prefix such as `/admin/*`, the non-normalized canonical path may not match the protected prefix. As a result, an unauthenticated request may bypass the configured path-based security constraint. #### Tested Version Jetty: 12.1.8 JDK: 17.0.18 Maven: 3.9.14 Maven artifacts used: org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:12.1.8 org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-security:12.1.8 org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-session:12.1.8 Only confirmed Jetty 12.1.8 so far. #### Minimal Reproduction Starts a minimal Jetty server with the following security setup: ```java SecurityHandler.PathMapped security = new SecurityHandler.PathMapped(); security.put("/admin/*", Constraint.from("admin")); security.put("/*", Constraint.ALLOWED); security.setAuthenticator(new BasicAuthenticator()); ``` The test then sends requests with no `Authorization` header. Observed result: ``` GET /admin/secret -> 401 GET /public;x/../admin/secret -> 200 ``` The handler receives paths such as: `/public/../admin/secret` This suggests that the `/admin/*` security constraint is bypassed because `PathMapped` matching is performed against the non-normalized canonical path. #### Suspected Root Cause The suspected root cause is in `URIUtil.canonicalPath()`. The relevant logic is approximately: ```java for (int i = 0; i < end; i++) { char c = encodedPath.charAt(i); switch (c) { case ';': if (builder == null) {