CVE-2026-81726

### Summary Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs. ### Details - **Vulnerability type:** File sandbox bypass - **Affected component:** `TransitionParser.train`, `TransitionParser.parse`, `AveragedPerceptron.save`, `AveragedPerceptron.load`, `PerceptronTagger.save_to_json`, `save_maxent_params` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. - **Patched versions:** Not yet patched - **Root cause:** Model import and export helpers use built-in `open()` on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers. `TransitionParser.train()` writes outside allowed roots, `TransitionParser.parse()` reads outside allowed roots, `AveragedPerceptron` bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while `pathsec.open()` or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths. ### PoC **Preconditions** - The application enables `pathsec` enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths. **Steps** 1. Enable `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory. 2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that root. 3. Observe the same paths are rejected by negative-control guarded helpers such as `pathsec.open()`, `PerceptronTagger.load_from_json()`, or `load_maxent_params()`. 4. Observe the vulnerable APIs still read or write outside-root files successfully. **Minimal reproducible excerpt** ```text transition_train_exists True transition_parse_loader_read_bytes 13 averaged_load_keys ['bias'] maxent_save wrote ['alwayson.tab', 'labels.txt'] ``` ### Impact Consumers that rely on `pathsec` for local