CVE-2026-77313
## Summary `validate_url_ssrf` resolves the hostname, checks the IP against private ranges, then **discards the IP and returns the hostname URL string**. aiohttp performs a fresh, independent DNS resolution at connect time. An attacker controlling DNS for a hostname (TTL 0, alternating public IP and internal IP) passes validation on the first lookup and connects to the internal IP on the second — a classic check-then-use race. SECURITY_SSRF.md line 63 explicitly claims DNS-rebinding is prevented; it is not. ## Root Cause `src/core/utils.py:523` returns the hostname URL after validation; the resolved IP is never pinned. A repo grep of `http/` and `utils.py` for `TCPConnector` / `resolver` / `response.history` / `on_request_redirect` / IP-pinning returns NONE. Each module builds a fresh `ClientSession` per call → the connect-time `getaddrinfo` is independent of the validation-time lookup. ## Impact Defeats the SSRF guard on ALL modules that call it (readable internal fetch). Independent of IP-range completeness — the private IP is never presented to `is_private_ip`. Requires attacker DNS control + winning the resolution race → AC:H. ## Proof of Concept Code-proven: `validate_url_ssrf` returns the hostname (utils.py:523); no pinned-IP connector anywhere. Two independent resolutions occur (validation-time and aiohttp connect-time). ``` attacker DNS: rebind.attacker.tld TTL 0, alternating public IP and the cloud metadata IP execute_module http.get {"url":"http://rebind.attacker.tld/latest/meta-data/..."} ``` ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: `http.get {url:"http://rebind.attacker.tld/..."}`. Guard: `validate_url_with_env_config`. Bypass proof: `getaddrinfo(rebind.attacker.tld)` returns the public IP, `is_private_ip=False` (utils.py:511-519); returns the hostname URL (:523) — the IP is discarded. 2. Sink: `session.get("http://rebind.attacker.tld/...")` (get.py:116). aiohttp performs a FRESH independent `getaddrinfo` at connect → now resolves to the internal IP. Bypass proof:
Properties
- Severity
- high
- Summary
- Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard validates the resolved IP but connects by hostname, allowing DNS-rebinding TOCTOU
- Nvd fetched at
- 2026-11-22T12:30:49.958423+00:00
- Epss score
- 0.00296
- Cvss severity
- HIGH
- Cvss score
- 7.1
- Retrieved at
- 2026-11-22T12:32:28+00:00
- Ghsa published
- 2026-11-20T00:09:23Z
- Source url
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v
- Ghsa updated
- 2026-11-20T00:09:24Z
- Ghsa id
- GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v
- Last source
- FIRST EPSS
- Score
- 7.1
- Cvss version
- 3.1
- Cve id
- CVE-2026-77313
- Cvss vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- First seen by Signal
- 2026-11-19T23:31:53+00:00
- Name
- CVE-2026-77313
- Is ghsa only
- false
- Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Related Entities (4)
HAS_WEAKNESS (2)
AFFECTS (1)
VULNERABLE_TO (1)
Related research
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