HIGHCVSS v3.1 7.1Vulnerability

CVE-2026-77313

## Summary `validate_url_ssrf` resolves the hostname, checks the IP against private ranges, then **discards the IP and returns the hostname URL string**. aiohttp performs a fresh, independent DNS resolution at connect time. An attacker controlling DNS for a hostname (TTL 0, alternating public IP and internal IP) passes validation on the first lookup and connects to the internal IP on the second — a classic check-then-use race. SECURITY_SSRF.md line 63 explicitly claims DNS-rebinding is prevented; it is not. ## Root Cause `src/core/utils.py:523` returns the hostname URL after validation; the resolved IP is never pinned. A repo grep of `http/` and `utils.py` for `TCPConnector` / `resolver` / `response.history` / `on_request_redirect` / IP-pinning returns NONE. Each module builds a fresh `ClientSession` per call → the connect-time `getaddrinfo` is independent of the validation-time lookup. ## Impact Defeats the SSRF guard on ALL modules that call it (readable internal fetch). Independent of IP-range completeness — the private IP is never presented to `is_private_ip`. Requires attacker DNS control + winning the resolution race → AC:H. ## Proof of Concept Code-proven: `validate_url_ssrf` returns the hostname (utils.py:523); no pinned-IP connector anywhere. Two independent resolutions occur (validation-time and aiohttp connect-time). ``` attacker DNS: rebind.attacker.tld TTL 0, alternating public IP and the cloud metadata IP execute_module http.get {"url":"http://rebind.attacker.tld/latest/meta-data/..."} ``` ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: `http.get {url:"http://rebind.attacker.tld/..."}`. Guard: `validate_url_with_env_config`. Bypass proof: `getaddrinfo(rebind.attacker.tld)` returns the public IP, `is_private_ip=False` (utils.py:511-519); returns the hostname URL (:523) — the IP is discarded. 2. Sink: `session.get("http://rebind.attacker.tld/...")` (get.py:116). aiohttp performs a FRESH independent `getaddrinfo` at connect → now resolves to the internal IP. Bypass proof:

Properties

Severity
high
Summary
Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard validates the resolved IP but connects by hostname, allowing DNS-rebinding TOCTOU
Nvd fetched at
2026-11-22T12:30:49.958423+00:00
Epss score
0.00296
Cvss severity
HIGH
Cvss score
7.1
Retrieved at
2026-11-22T12:32:28+00:00
Ghsa published
2026-11-20T00:09:23Z
Source url
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v
Ghsa updated
2026-11-20T00:09:24Z
Ghsa id
GHSA-pfg2-w999-497v
Last source
FIRST EPSS
Score
7.1
Cvss version
3.1
Cve id
CVE-2026-77313
Cvss vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
First seen by Signal
2026-11-19T23:31:53+00:00
Name
CVE-2026-77313
Is ghsa only
false
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Related Entities (4)

AFFECTS (1)

→[Software]pip/flyto-core

VULNERABLE_TO (1)

←[Software]pip/flyto-core

Related research

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CVE-2026-77313 (CVSS v3.1 7.1) — Ninja Signal Threat Intelligence | Ninja Signal