CVE-2026-75914

### Maintainer resolution The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below. ### Summary image_analyze follows workspace symlinks and leaks outside-workspace file bytes to the vision endpoint The image_analyze tool resolves its image_path with a bare context.workspace.join instead of routing through ToolContext::resolve_path. The pre-join lexical check rejects absolute paths, Windows prefixes, and parent-dir components but never canonicalizes, so a symlink inside the workspace whose name ends in an image extension and whose target sits outside the workspace is read transparently. The tool has ReadOnly capability and the trait default makes it auto-approved, so the bypass executes with no user prompt. ### Details In `crates/tui/src/vision/tools.rs` (v0.8.37, lines 104-123): ```rust async fn execute(&self, input: Value, context: &ToolContext) -> Result<ToolResult, ToolError> { let image_path = required_str(&input, "image_path")?; let prompt = input .get("prompt") .and_then(|v| v.as_str()) .unwrap_or("Describe this image in detail."); let image_path_buf = Path::new(image_path); if image_path_buf.components().any(|c| { matches!( c, Component::Prefix(_) | Component::RootDir | Component::ParentDir ) }) { return Err(ToolError::execution_failed( "image_path must be a relative path within the workspace and cannot escape it.", )); } let resolved_path = context.workspace.join(image_path_buf); let (image_data, mime_type) = Self::read_image_file(&resolved_path).await?; ``` `read_image_file` (lines 31-39) is a `tokio::fs::read(path)` call which follows symlinks. The bytes are then base64-encoded and embedded as `