CVE-2026-73560

### Summary `vllm/transformers_utils/processors/mimo_v2_omni.py` — the multimodal processor for `MiMoV2OmniForCausalLM` — issues `requests.get(...)` directly on user-supplied image and audio URL strings and `Image.open(...)` on user-supplied local paths, **without** the SSRF / `allowed_local_media_path` checks that `vllm.multimodal.utils.MediaConnector` was hardened with in **GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc**, **GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536**, and **GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr**. This is the same bug class as those three published advisories, in a code path the patches missed. When a user passes a URL or local-file string through `multi_modal_data` (e.g. `LLM.generate(multi_modal_data={"image": "http://..."})`), the processor takes the unsanitized string and dispatches it without any URL-scheme allowlist, network-target allowlist, size cap, or local-path allowlist. ### Details **File:** `vllm/transformers_utils/processors/mimo_v2_omni.py` (current `main`) **Sink 1 — image SSRF + local-file read (`_fetch_image`, lines 231–249):** ```python def _fetch_image(src: Any) -> Image.Image: if isinstance(src, Image.Image): return _to_rgb(src) if isinstance(src, bytes): return _to_rgb(copy.deepcopy(Image.open(BytesIO(src)))) if isinstance(src, str): if src.startswith(("http://", "https://")): r = requests.get(src, timeout=30) # SSRF: no allowlist, follows redirects r.raise_for_status() return _to_rgb(copy.deepcopy(Image.open(BytesIO(r.content)))) if src.startswith("file://"): return _to_rgb(Image.open(src[7:])) # arbitrary local file read if src.startswith("data:image"): ... return _to_rgb(Image.open(src)) # fallback also opens local files raise ValueError(f"Unrecognized image source: {type(src)}") ``` **Sink 2 — audio SSRF (around line 471):** ```python elif audio.startswith(("http://", "https://")): r = requests.get(audio, time