CVE-2026-71861
### Summary The `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay. ### Background The package uses the standard "signed `GetCallerIdentity`" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves: - `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token. - `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity. The binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the
Properties
- Summary
- Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders
- Severity
- high
- Nvd fetched at
- 2026-11-19T03:31:17.617109+00:00
- Cvss score
- 7.4
- Cvss severity
- HIGH
- Retrieved at
- 2026-11-19T03:32:39+00:00
- Ghsa published
- 2026-11-18T21:16:44Z
- Source url
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv
- Ghsa updated
- 2026-11-18T21:16:45Z
- Ghsa id
- GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv
- Last source
- GitHub Advisory Database
- Score
- 7.4
- Cvss version
- 3.1
- Cve id
- CVE-2026-71861
- Cvss vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- First seen by Signal
- 2026-11-18T19:12:36+00:00
- Name
- CVE-2026-71861
- Is ghsa only
- false
- Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Published at
- 2026-11-18T16:18:16.967
Related Entities (5)
HAS_WEAKNESS (3)
AFFECTS (1)
VULNERABLE_TO (1)
Related research
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