HIGHCVSS v3.1 7.4Vulnerability

CVE-2026-71861

### Summary The `auth/aws` package of the `chainguard.dev/sdk` Go library provides Chainguard's AWS-backed identity federation (an AWS workload proves its identity to Chainguard by signing an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request). Its verifier, `VerifyToken`, reads the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` binding headers from a presented token but does not require them to be covered by the SigV4 signature. AWS STS validates only the headers listed in `SignedHeaders` and ignores all others, so an attacker can take a `GetCallerIdentity` request that a victim signed for a *different* relying party, inject or rewrite those two headers *after* signing (without invalidating the signature), and replay it to any service that authenticates callers with `VerifyToken`. The binding those headers were meant to provide is therefore forgeable — a verifier-side (relying-party) authentication bypass / cross-service token replay. ### Background The package uses the standard "signed `GetCallerIdentity`" pattern — the same approach HashiCorp Vault's AWS auth method and Kubernetes `aws-iam-authenticator` use: the caller signs an AWS STS `GetCallerIdentity` request with its AWS credentials to prove who it is, and presents that signed request as a bearer token. It has two halves: - `GenerateToken` (client): builds the `GetCallerIdentity` request, adds the `Chainguard-Audience` and `Chainguard-Identity` headers that bind the proof to a specific Chainguard audience (issuer) and assumable identity, SigV4-signs it, and serializes it into a token. - `VerifyToken` (relying party): decodes the token, checks those two binding headers, forwards the request to AWS STS to confirm the caller's real AWS identity (ARN), and returns it so a Chainguard token can be issued for that identity. The binding headers exist so a proof minted for one audience/identity cannot be reused for another — a defense against cross-service replay — and their security depends entirely on being covered by the

Properties

Summary
Chainguard SDK: AWS SigV4 token replay in auth/aws.VerifyToken — Chainguard-Audience/Chainguard-Identity binding headers not required in SignedHeaders
Severity
high
Nvd fetched at
2026-11-19T03:31:17.617109+00:00
Cvss score
7.4
Cvss severity
HIGH
Retrieved at
2026-11-19T03:32:39+00:00
Ghsa published
2026-11-18T21:16:44Z
Source url
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv
Ghsa updated
2026-11-18T21:16:45Z
Ghsa id
GHSA-wq26-3j2m-4hvv
Last source
GitHub Advisory Database
Score
7.4
Cvss version
3.1
Cve id
CVE-2026-71861
Cvss vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
First seen by Signal
2026-11-18T19:12:36+00:00
Name
CVE-2026-71861
Is ghsa only
false
Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Published at
2026-11-18T16:18:16.967

Related Entities (5)

AFFECTS (1)

VULNERABLE_TO (1)

Related research

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CVE-2026-71861 (CVSS v3.1 7.4) — Ninja Signal Threat Intelligence | Ninja Signal