CVE-2026-71494

### Impact Sensitive information exposure in the Infracost Terraform Cloud/Enterprise integration. Several code paths attached a configured secret token to a request whose host was taken straight from the scanned Terraform, with no check that the host was the trusted endpoint. The condition that matters is whether a Terraform Cloud/Enterprise (or registry) token is present in the run: if one is, the injected hostname can disclose it. Impact therefore depends on the trigger. Under `on: pull_request` (the only configuration in Infracost's documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets, so no token is present. It only reaches token disclosure under `pull_request_target`, a same-repository pull request, or another CI setup that provides the token alongside untrusted Terraform, and exploiting an untrusted fork pull request also typically needs a maintainer to approve the workflow run. The patch scopes the token to the trusted host regardless of trigger. ### Patches Fixed in `v0.10.45` ([#3590](https://github.com/infracost/infracost/pull/3590)) by attaching a token only when the destination host matches the configured trusted host; otherwise Infracost refuses to send it and skips remote variable loading - Installed via the official script, a package manager, or the `latest` Docker tag: upgrade to `v0.10.45` (or later) to receive the fix. - Pinned to a specific version or image digest: bump to `v0.10.45`. ### Workarounds No full fix without upgrading. To limit exposure: use `on: pull_request` rather than `pull_request_target`, pin `organization`, `workspace`, and `host` in Infracost config so the `.tf` hostname is ignored, and keep Terraform Cloud and registry tokens out of runs that process untrusted pull request content.