CVE-2026-69218

When Ember receives an HTTP/2 `HEADERS` or `PUSH_PROMISE` frame without the `END_HEADERS` flag, it buffers the header block fragment and waits for subsequent `CONTINUATION` frames. These accumulate unbounded until the connection closes. ### Impact A remote, unauthenticated peer can exhaust the heap on any Ember endpoint that has HTTP/2 enabled: - **ember-server with `.withHttp2`**: any HTTP/2 client can trigger this against any reachable path (including paths that return 404). No authentication is required because the attack completes before the request is decoded. - **ember-client with `.withHttp2`**: a malicious or compromised origin server can trigger this via the response header block. A single in-flight request is sufficient. Memory consumption is bounded only by the attacker's upload bandwidth and the connection lifetime. ### Prerequisites - `EmberServerBuilder` configured with `.withHttp2`. - For the server: the attacker can establish an HTTP/2 connection - For the client: the application makes a request to an attacker-controlled origin. HTTP/2 incoming headers exceeding the configured size limit are buffer in order to generate an informative HTTP 413 response. If a client does not stop sending headers, this leads to memory exhaustion. ### Patches The fix bounds the accumulated header-block size at `SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE` (derived from `EmberServerBuilder.maxHeaderSize` / `EmberClientBuilder.maxResponseHeaderSize`). When a `CONTINUATION` frame would push the accumulated block over that limit, the connection is terminated with `GOAWAY`. The `receiveHeadersTimeout` additionally bounds how long an incomplete header block may remain open. ### Workarounds - Disable HTTP/2 (`.withHttp2`) until upgraded (default). It is off by default. - If HTTP/2 must remain enabled, place ember behind a reverse proxy that terminates HTTP/2 and speaks HTTP/1.1 to ember.