CVE-2026-66064

## Summary `sendFile` derives the served filename from the raw request path while opening the file from the cleaned path, so appending a trailing slash empties the derived name and defeats both the never-serve rule for the ACL file and the block list. ## Finding (Medium): trailing-slash ACL and hidden-file bypass httpserver/handler.go, sendFile (lines 789-801) takes the filename from the RAW req.URL.Path while the file itself is opened from the filepath.Clean-ed path. The two disagree, and a trailing slash makes the derived name the empty string. Both protections key on that derived name, so both are defeated: the rule that never serves the .goshs ACL file, and the acl.Block list. Measured, with negative controls: ``` GET /blocked/secret.txt -> 404 (control, correctly blocked) GET /blocked/secret.txt/ -> 200 + contents GET /blocked/.goshs/ -> 200, returns the ACL file itself, including the admin:$2a$... bcrypt hash ``` Unauthenticated when the ACL is configured block-only (common usage). Stated precisely: AUTHENTICATION IS NOT BYPASSED. An unauthenticated request against a directory protected by authentication still returns 401 under the same trick; I tested that. The claim is specifically that the block list and the ACL-file protection are bypassed. In-tree evidence that sendFile is the defect: the sibling handlers doDir and bulkDownload both derive the name correctly; sendFile is the lone outlier. ## Suggested fixes 1. Derive the served filename from the same cleaned path used to open the file, so the authorization decision and the file access cannot disagree. ## Tooling AI assistance was used while investigating. The finding was reproduced against a running server on loopback with negative controls, including the 404-versus-200 pair and the authenticated-directory control that shows authentication is not affected.