CVE-2026-62982

## Summary CVE-2026-32608 ("Command Injection via Process Names in Action Command Templates") was fixed (commit `5680a5d`) by adding `_sanitize_mustache_dict`, which replaces the shell operators `&&`, `|`, `>>`, `>` with spaces in the values rendered into action command templates. The sanitizer only processes **top-level string** values (`if isinstance(v, str)`). Attacker-controlled **nested** values — most notably a process's **`cmdline`, which Glances exposes as a `list`** and which is fully attacker-controlled via argv — are passed through **unsanitized**. Because the Mustache renderer (`chevron`) does **not** HTML-escape the pipe character `|`, a `|` embedded in such a nested value survives into the rendered command and is then interpreted by `secure_popen` (which still interprets `&&`/`|`/`>` by default, `allow_operators=True`), re-introducing the exact command injection the CVE was meant to close. ## Details The fix (`glances/actions.py`): ```python _SHELL_OPERATORS = ('&&', '|', '>>', '>') # line 25 def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict): # line 28 ... for k, v in mustache_dict.items(): if isinstance(v, str): # line 40 <-- ONLY top-level strings for op in _SHELL_OPERATORS: v = v.replace(op, ' ') safe[k] = v else: safe[k] = v # nested list/dict passed VERBATIM return safe ``` Render + sink (`glances/actions.py:104-111`): ```python safe_dict = _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict) cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict) # chevron does NOT escape '|' ... ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # secure_popen(cmd, allow_operators=True) ``` `secure_popen` (`glances/secure.py:17`, default `allow_operators=True`) splits the command by `&&`, then `__secure_popen` interprets `|` (pipe to a new process) and `>` (write output to a file