CVE-2026-61835

### Summary The SSRF protection on Directus's file-import-from-URL feature can be bypassed using the address `0.0.0.0`. While `127.0.0.1` and other internal addresses are denied, `0.0.0.0` is not added to the blocklist. On Linux and macOS, connecting to `0.0.0.0` reaches localhost, so an authenticated user with file-upload rights can make the server fetch internal services and retrieve the response as a downloadable file (full-read SSRF). ### Affected Versions - **Affected:** Directus `<= 12.0.0` (confirmed on `directus/directus:latest`, v11.17.3, with default configuration) - **Patched:** Directus `>= 12.0.0` ### Details Directus uses a deny-list config, `IMPORT_IP_DENY_LIST`, whose default value is `['0.0.0.0', '169.254.169.254']`. The issue is in how `api/src/request/is-denied-ip.ts` processes this list. When it encounters the entry `0.0.0.0`, it treats it as a special keyword meaning "block all local network interfaces," but it never blocks the literal address `0.0.0.0` itself. The handler sets the network-interface flag and skips to the next entry without adding `0.0.0.0` to the blocklist. What actually gets blocked is the loopback subnet `127.0.0.0/8` (from the `lo` interface) plus whatever addresses are assigned to the machine's network interfaces. The address `0.0.0.0` is not inside `127.0.0.0/8`; it belongs to the separate `0.0.0.0/8` range. So a request to `http://0.0.0.0:8055/` passes the blocklist check as "allowed." At the OS level, however, connecting to `0.0.0.0` reaches localhost, functionally equivalent to `127.0.0.1`. The same gap applies to the IPv6 unspecified address `::`. As a result, the SSRF protection is bypassed. ### Impact An authenticated user with create permission on `directus_files` (file-upload rights) can make the server issue requests to its own localhost via the `/files/import` endpoint. The response body is stored as a downloadable file, making this a full-read SSRF. On bare-metal or single-host deployments, this can rea