CVE-2026-59832

Reporter: Cavan Loughran, Celvex Group Inc. Summary ------- The /snippets/*filepath route handler serveSnippets in kernel/server/serve.go performs a bare filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath) on the single-decoded c.Request.URL.Path and serves the result with c.File(), with NO IsSubPath containment and NO IsSensitivePath denylist - unlike the sibling /export/ (serveExport) and /appearance/ (serveAppearance) handlers, which both carry IsSubPath, and unlike /assets/ (serveAssets), whose traversal was fixed in GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664. Because util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets, an authenticated request to GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json resolves to WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json and leaks the kernel API token and AccessAuthCode (the same secret file CVE-2026-30869 leaked from /export/); GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/temp/siyuan.db leaks the full document database. Affected versions ----------------- v3.6.5 and current master (verified by direct source read). The /export/ and /assets/ fixes were endpoint-scoped and never reached serveSnippets. Technical detail ---------------- Sink, kernel/server/serve.go, serveSnippets (verbatim, current master and v3.6.5): func serveSnippets(ginServer *gin.Engine) { ginServer.Handle("GET", "/snippets/*filepath", model.CheckAuth, func(c *gin.Context) { filePath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/snippets/") if !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) { if "conf.json" == filePath { c.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized) return } } ext := filepath.Ext(filePath) name := strings.TrimSuffix(filePath, ext) confSnippets, err := model.LoadSnippets() ... for _, s := range confSnippets { if s.Name == name && ("" != ext && s.Type == ext[1:]) { c.Header("Content-Type", mime.TypeByExtension(ext)) c.String(http.StatusOK, s.Content)