CVE-2026-55873

### Summary SeaweedFS routes requests signed with SigV4 service `s3tables` to the S3Tables management API. Authorization on that path collapsed account-less S3 identities into the shared `admin` account and failed open, so a user holding only ordinary S3 `Read` credentials — and no S3Tables-specific permission — could invoke S3Tables management operations such as `GET /buckets` and enumerate administrator-owned table bucket inventory (names and ARNs). The same handler backs the Iceberg REST catalog, which was affected by the same flaw. ### Impact An authenticated low-privileged S3 user can cross the boundary between ordinary S3 object access and S3Tables management. Confirmed impact is disclosure of administrator-owned table bucket inventory (bucket names and ARNs); in shared or multi-tenant deployments this can reveal tenant naming and operational structure. ### Affected versions SeaweedFS `>= 4.08, < 4.34` (the S3Tables management API was introduced in 4.08). ### Patched versions Fixed in **4.34** (#9961). Administrator status is now decided by the `ACTION_ADMIN` capability rather than by a collapsed `admin` account id, S3Tables authorization no longer defaults to allow, and the tautological ListTableBuckets gate was removed. Related hardening of the same root cause landed in #9962, #9963, and #9971. ### Workaround No configuration workaround — upgrade to 4.34 or later. ### Credit Reported by **TA-MU-TA**.