CVE-2026-55445

### Summary The init guard middleware in Qinglong only checks `/api/user/init` paths but not `/open/user/init`, which is whitelisted from JWT authentication and rewritten to `/api/user/init` after the guard has already passed, allowing unauthenticated admin credential reset on initialized instances. ### Affected Package - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Package:** whyour/qinglong - **Affected versions:** < 6bec52dca158 - **Patched versions:** >= 6bec52dca158 ### Severity Medium ### CWE CWE-287 — Improper Authentication ### Details The Qinglong panel has an initialization endpoint (`/api/user/init`) that allows setting admin credentials. Once the system is initialized, an init guard middleware is supposed to block further calls. The middleware in `back/loaders/express.ts` only checks: ```javascript !['/api/user/init', '/api/user/notification/init'].includes(pathLower) ``` However, the application also has a URL rewrite rule: `rewrite('/open/*', '/api/$1')`. The `/open/*` paths are whitelisted from JWT authentication. The middleware ordering creates the bypass: first, JWT auth sees `/open/*` paths match the whitelist regex and skips authentication. Second, the init guard only checks for `/api/user/init` -- `/open/user/init` passes through as "not an init path". Third, the URL rewrite transforms `/open/user/init` to `/api/user/init` after the guard has already passed. This means an unauthenticated attacker can send `PUT /open/user/init` with new credentials to reset the admin account on any Qinglong panel instance, gaining full administrative access. ### PoC ```javascript /** * CVE-2026-3965 - Qinglong Panel /open/user/init Auth Bypass * * The init guard middleware only checks /api/user/init paths. * But /open/user/init is whitelisted from JWT auth and rewritten * to /api/user/init via express-urlrewrite AFTER the guard. */ "use strict"; // Simulate the init guard middleware exactly as in the source function initGuardMiddleware(reqPath, authInfo) { cons