CVE-2026-55178

### Summary Multiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in the request URL (a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request) and failed to re-authorize a **second, caller-influenced dataset** that the request reached through a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or request body. This "authorize the URL resource, read a *different* dataset un-re-authorized" pattern let callers read data from datasets they have no access to. The most severe instances require **no authentication at all** (anonymous, network-only). Others require only the **default `editor` role** that any self-service signup / upload user receives. All issues are fixed in **1.2.3**. There is no complete configuration workaround — upgrading is the only full remediation. ### Impact Depending on the endpoint, an attacker can read, for datasets they cannot otherwise access: - the dataset's **vector tile data** (actual feature geometries/attributes), - the dataset's **raster pixels**, - backing-table **rows**, - and **metadata** — table name, column schema, feature count, extent, source URL/filename, contacts, and **sampled row values**. ### Affected versions All versions **prior to 1.2.3** (includes the published 1.0.0, 1.2.0, and 1.2.2 releases and their PyPI/npm/GHCR artifacts). Fixed in **1.2.3**. ### Findings **1. Anonymous metadata + private vector-tile disclosure via public maps (PR #235)** `GET /maps/{id}` and `GET /maps/{id}/style.json` authorized the map but not each layer's backing dataset. A public map that references a private dataset leaked that dataset's table name, column schema, feature count, extent, and sampled values to anonymous callers. `style.json` additionally returned a vector-tile URL carrying an HMAC signature bound to **neither user nor map**, which the tile endpoint accepts for non-public datasets with no user check — so the signature is **replayable** to read the private dataset's actual vector tiles. *(Anonymous · High)* **2. An