CVE-2026-54162

## Summary Ember's interactive TUI renders fields taken from the monitored Caddy server's access logs — most notably the request URI — straight to the operator's terminal without neutralising terminal escape or control sequences (CWE-150). Those log fields are populated from arbitrary, unauthenticated HTTP requests, so any remote client can embed ANSI/OSC/CSI control bytes that the operator's terminal emulator interprets when the log row is displayed. The bytes survive the whole pipeline: Caddy escapes them into its JSON access log as unicode escapes, ember's `ParseLogLine` decodes them back to raw `0x1b`/`0x07` bytes, and the row formatters concatenate them into the bubbletea `View()` output with no encoding before they reach `os.Stdout`. ## Impact An **unauthenticated, remote** attacker who can send HTTP requests to the Caddy server that ember monitors can inject terminal escape sequences into the operator's TUI. The trigger is a single ordinary HTTP request with control bytes in the request target. It requires no authentication; because the payload is reflected through Caddy's normal access log, it works even when ember's log listener is bound only to loopback. When the operator views the Logs tab — ember's default, zero-config mode — the terminal emulator interprets the injected sequences. Broadly-supported, demonstrated impact includes: - **Monitoring-dashboard spoofing** — CSI cursor/erase/scroll sequences forge or hide log rows so the operator misjudges the monitored server's state. - **Clipboard hijacking (OSC 52)** — attacker-chosen text is written into the operator's system clipboard, staging a payload the operator may later paste into a shell. - **Window-title spoofing (OSC 0/2)** — to support social engineering. The impact ceiling depends on the operator's terminal emulator and usually requires a further operator action (e.g. a paste) to fully escalate; this is not general-case RCE, though specific terminal emulators have historically escalated esca