CVE-2026-53814

### Summary OpenClaw hook ingress can start automated agent runs using a configured hook token. In affected releases, a hook-triggered run could select a bundled CLI backend that received owner-scoped MCP loopback authority instead of a scope appropriate for hook ingress. This issue affects the boundary between hook-token automation and owner-only MCP tools. It does not affect deployments with hooks disabled. ### Affected configurations This affects deployments where hooks are enabled, `/hooks/agent` is reachable with a valid hook token, and a bundled CLI backend can be selected for the hook-triggered run. ### Impact A caller with the hook token could cause the spawned CLI runtime to see or call MCP tools that should have been owner-only. The practical impact depends on which MCP tools are available; the reported proof used persistent cron state as a representative owner-only action. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.5.20`. Fixed in the `2026.5.20` stable release. ### Mitigations Upgrade to `[email protected]` or later. Keep hook tokens secret, restrict network access to hook endpoints, and disable hooks when they are not needed.