CVE-2026-53552

### Summary `Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `manager` role (or any role that includes the `FileSync` / `EditProject` permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because `Edit` runs `git remote set-url` on the project's working tree. ### Affected `zhenorzz/goploy` `develop` HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the `zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5` Docker image (`docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44`). The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API. ### Vulnerable code `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile` (creates file under any project's directory; body controls `projectId`): ```go func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename) // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content) id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow() } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile` (overwrites file content; body controls file id,