CVE-2026-52773

### Summary YesWiki's archived-revision view reflects the `time` `GET` parameter into a hidden HTML input in `handlers/page/show.php` without escaping. Because MySQL coerces malformed `DATETIME` strings, an attacker can append HTML or JavaScript to a valid archived revision timestamp, still load that archived revision, and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser. The vulnerable form is only rendered when the victim can both read and edit the target page. In restricted deployments this requires a victim with `read` and `write` access to that page. On a default `doryphore 4.6.5` install, public pages such as `PagePrincipale` were editable anonymously during validation, so the issue can also affect unauthenticated visitors in that configuration. ### Details The request routing path uses the user-controlled `time` parameter to load a specific page revision. In `includes/YesWiki.php` around `Run()` line `1223`, the request is routed through: ```php $this->SetPage($this->LoadPage($tag, isset($_REQUEST['time']) ? $_REQUEST['time'] : '')); ``` `LoadPage()` delegates to `PageManager::getOne()` in `includes/services/PageManager.php` around line `75`, which builds a SQL predicate directly from the supplied revision time: ```php $timeQuery = $time ? "time = '{$this->dbService->escape($time)}'" : "latest = 'Y'"; ``` If the loaded page is an archived revision (`latest == 'N'`) and the current user has `write` access, `handlers/page/show.php` around lines `43-49` renders an edit form for that archived revision and copies `$_GET['time']` into a hidden input without `htmlspecialchars()`: ```php $time = isset($_GET['time']) ? $_GET['time'] : ''; echo $this->FormOpen(testUrlInIframe() ? 'editiframe' : 'edit', '', 'get'); <input type="hidden" name="time" value="<?php echo $time; ?>" /> ``` That sink is reachable only when all of the following are true: 1. The target page has at least one archived revision. 2. The victim can `read` the target page. 3. The victim ca